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INTRODUCTION
On October 18, 1995, the House of Representatives voted
332 to 83 to reject a Federal Sentencing Commission proposal.'
Federal prison inmates in four prisons responded with a ram-
page, breaking windows, torching mattresses, injuring prison
staff, and racking up millions of dollars in property damage.'
The sudden burst of violence was so alarming that officials
quickly locked down federal prison populations nationwide.
BA., 1977, Grand Valley State University, M.SJ., 1990, Ohio University, J.D.,
1997, Notre Dame Law School; Thomas J. White Scholar, 1995-97. I thank
Professor John Robinson and my fellow White Scholars for their help with this
article. I also thank Professor Edward J. Baum, my husband, for his insightful
questions and comments.
1. U.S. Clamps Down After Prison Rebellions, MoNTREAL GAZErrI, Oct. 22,
1995, at B1, 1995 WL 6987648.
2. Id.
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What caused such rage?s Congress's refusal to allow a Sen-
tencing Commission proposal to take automatic effect on
November 1, 1995. The proposal would have erased sentencing
disparities embedded in federal statutes, characterized by some
as "Draconian federal crack laws,"4 that punish possessors of
crack cocaine far more harshly than those who possess the same
drug in powder form.5
To many observers,6 this disparity and its disproportionately
harsh effect on young black men is proof of underlying racial
bias in the war on drugs. In 1993, a typical year, blacks
accounted for 88.3 percent of federal crack cocaine distribution
convictions, Hispanics for 7.1 percent, and whites for just 4.1 per-
cent; the racial breakdown for powder cocaine offenses, in con-
trast, was 27.4 percent black, 39.3 percent Hispanic, and 32
percent white. 7 According to a United States Sentencing Com-
mission's Special Report to the Congress, released in February of
1995, these and other data lead to "the inescapable conclusion
that Blacks comprise the largest percentage of those affected by
the penalties associated with crack cocaine."' The Commission
quickly added that their research did not reveal evidence of dis-
criminatory intent in the design of the harsh crack-cocaine pen-
alties, but it concluded:
When one form of a drug can be rather easily converted to
another form of the same drug and when that second form
is punished at a quantity ratio 100 times greater than the
original form, it would appear reasonable to require the
3. According to the Chicago Tribune: "'The inmates said they were trying
to send a message to the US. government,' said Jim Hough, a Greenville
corrections officer, referring to the inmates who rioted. 'They said the law is
racially motivated.'" Gary Marx, Violence Now a Fact of Federal Prison Life; Congrss'
Crackdown on Crime Puts Younger Inmates Behind Ban, CI. TRm., North Sports
Final Edition, Oct. 24, 1995, at 1.
4. Paul M. Barrett, FBIs Antiviolence Campaign in Los Angeles is Again
Raising Issue of Racial Discrimination, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1996, at A22.
5. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 established a sentencing scheme that
punishes a person convicted of selling 5 grams of crack cocaine with a five-year
minimum sentence. It takes 500 grams of powder cocaine to trigger the same
minimum; thus, the Act established "what has come to be known as a 100-to-1
quantity ratio between the two forms of cocaine." UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FFDERAL SENTENCING
Poucy, at 1 (1995), hereinafter SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT.
6. Typical of this view are the statements of Jesse Jackson at the October
1995 "Million Man March:" Rev. Jackson denounced the 100:1 disparity as
"wrong," "unfair," "racist," and "ungodly," according to Jefferson Morley, Crack
in Black & W7it WASH. PosT, Nov. 19, 1995, at Cl.
7. SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT at xi.
8. Id.
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existence of sufficient policy bases to support such a sen-
tencing scheme regardless of racial impact. Moreover,
when such an enhanced ratio for a particular form of a
drug has disproportionate effect on one segment of the
population, it is particularly important that sufficient pol-
icy bases exist in support of the enhanced ratio.
9
As Jesse Jackson reportedly pointed out to President Clinton
in a face-to-face meeting, "[p]owdered cocaine is the source of
crack."1" Where wholesalers of powder cocaine often get proba-
tion, while dealers of even small amounts of crack receive harsh
mandatory minimum sentences, and where approximately ninety
percent of the people who end up in prison as a result are black,
this is "obviously racist,"11 Jackson said.
But does enforcement of this facially neutral sentencing
scheme really constitute racism? Some commentators argue that
vigorous pursuit of crack offenders, who are often associated with
well-heeled and well-armed gangs terrorizing whole neighbor-
hoods, benefits the black community. Randall Kennedy argues
that enforcing stiff penalties for drug offenders actually helps the
black community, even if blacks receive a disproportionate share
of the tough sentences:
This argument [that the federal crack laws are racist
because of their racially disparate impact] assumes that it
burdens the black community to sentence crack dealers to
long prison terms. But does it? What about the neighbors
- probably also black - of those who violate the crack
laws? They may well be helped by the long absence of
offenders who, but for prison terms, might continue to cor-
rupt their streets and children. Those who portray crack
dealers as representatives of the entire black community, a
status to which Marion Barry, Mike Tyson, and O.J. Simp-
son were also elevated during their brushes with the law,
do law-abiding African Americans a disservice.
Conservatives are right when they argue that blacks,
especially the poorest and most vulnerable, have more to
fear from a lenient or indifferent criminal justice system
than from one that punishes offenders too harshly.1 2
9. Id. at xii.
10. Gary Marx, Crack Time vs. Cocaine Debate Lingers on Sentencing, CI.
TRm., Oct. 31, 1995, at Al.
11. Id.
12. Randall Kennedy, Is Eveything Race, NEw REPUBuC, Jan. 1, 1996, at
1997]
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In the words of one resident of south-central Los Angeles, "If
anyone, white, black, green or purple, [endangers] my family, I
want done whatever is legally feasible to remove that person from
the community."13
Clouding discussion of the crack/powder disparity is the
larger, highly polarized societal struggle with the semantics of
racism. What is racism - is it something so ingrained in our
culture as to be inescapable? Is it a sin of the nation's past
requiring present-day atonement, or ancient history with no
place in present-day policy? At one pole of the debate is the
claim that racism is yesterday's problem, perpetuated today by a
civil rights establishment "which has a vested interest in making
exaggerated accusations of racism" in order to "cajole and intimi-
date whites into acquiescing in programs which financially and
politically benefit the civil rights establishment." 4 In this view,
the main problem facing blacks today is their own behavior:
[E]xcessive reliance on government, conspiratorial para-
noia about racism, a resistance to academic achievement as
"acting white," a celebration of the criminal and outlaw as
authentically black, and the normalization of illegitimacy
and dependency.' 5
At the other pole is the everything-is-racism view, one which sees
virtually every bad thing that happens to a black individual as
evidence of systemic racism. 6 In such a polarized climate, every
discussion of race, racism, and racism's real or imagined impacts
becomes politicized.
"Racism," in short, is an emotionally loaded word that has
wildly different meanings to different people in our society,
meanings that can lead to different conclusions in both politics
and policy. Individual understandings of what racism means and
what (if any) causal connection it has to present-day problems
are shaped by each person's experiences, assumptions, vantage
point, beliefs, and prejudices - and these understandings are
shaped not only by direct experience but also by the powerful
stories we have been told in words and pictures by the media.
These understandings, in the aggregate, become what we call
13. Barrett, supra note 4, quoting Cleve Freeman, an African-American.
14. DINESH D'SouzA, THE END OF RACiSM 23 (1995).
15. Id. at 24.
16. See, e.g., Floyd Weatherspoon, The Devastating Impact of theJustice System
on the Status of African-American Males: An Overview Perspective, 23 CAP. U. L. Rv.
23, 56 (1994); the author cites black males' higher rates of prostate cancer and
AIDS, "unhealthy eating habits, smoking, [and] a lack of physical exercise" as
part of a larger discussion of the effects of racism, relating these effects back to
the criminal justice system.
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public opinion, and public opinion has a powerful impact on
legislation.
If the political pressures of public opinion drive legislators
to make decisions that embody racial anxieties, and if those deci-
sions result in significantly increased burdens on black Ameri-
cans, it is the responsibility of the judiciary to scrutinize the
resulting laws more closely, despite their facial neutrality. In
United States v. Clary,17 District Judge Cahill concluded that the
100:1 ratio between crack and powder cocaine sentences is the
result of exactly that sort of political pressure, embodying racial
anxieties and leading to a disparate impact so significant that it
"shocks the conscience of the Court."' 8 He painstakingly traced
media narratives at several turning points in our history, docu-
menting how such narratives have overtly or subtlely played on
racial fears and resulted in harsh drug laws aimed at dis-
empowered minorities. In this article, I will connect Judge
Cahill's analysis to he work of mass communications researchers
who have traced the interaction between media narratives and
public perceptions of reality. I will argue that the current
mandatory crack-cocaine penalties, though facially neutral,
embody racial anxieties traceable to media narratives of the
crack cocaine story. I will also argue that current equal-protec-
tion analysis, with its focus on "discriminatory purpose,""9 simply
misses the sophisticated2" and unconscious forms of racism most
likely to become embodied in law today.
I. THE CASE AGAINST THE 100-TO-I DIsPARrY.
THE 1995 SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT
-.Histo teaches us that there have been but few infringements of
personal liberty by the state which have not been justified... . in the
name of righteousness and the public good, and few which have
not been directed, as they are now, at politically helpless
minorities.
21
17. 846 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
18. Id at 770.
19. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmEpiCAc CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1509 (2d ed.
1988).
20. See, e.g., the discussion of presidential campaign advisor Lee Atwater's
cynical use of convicted black rapist Willie Horton to inflame racial fears during
the 1988 presidential campaign, in MicHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT 11; see also
infra note 178.
21. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604 (1940)
(Stone, J., dissenting).
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Crack cocaine seemed to emerge out of nowhere to become
a national crisis in the mid-1980s. Alarmed at its rapid spread,
inflamed by media reports of ferocious gang wars, and fright-
ened at the perceived spread of crack use out of the inner city,
the public created enormous pressure on Congress to do some-
thing about crack.2" The urgency of public concern converged
with two tracks of legislation favoring determinative sentences;
together, these factors produced the disparate sentencing
schemes that exist today.
The first legislative initiative was the passage of the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act of 1984,24 designed to make criminal sentences
"more certain, less disparate, and sufficiently punitive."' With
this Act, the Sentencing Commission was formed and directed to
"promulgate a system of detailed, mandatory sentencing guide-
lines to assure more uniform federal court sentencing decisions.
In addition, the Act abolished parole for defendants sentenced
under the sentencing guidelines."26 The guidelines set mini-
mum and maximum penalties for various crimes, but they also
allow judges to take aggravating and mitigating factors into
account, permitting deviation from the guidelines when "there is
a [sic] unusual factor present in the case that is not taken into
consideration by the guidelines."'
The second legislative direction was a series of initiatives
incorporating statutory minimum penalties for specific offenses.
The Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 198628 and 1988' set mandatory
minimums for a variety of drug and firearms crimes. The 1986
Act established five-year and ten-year minimum sentences for
first-time drug traffickers, with the minimums triggered by the
quantity and type of drug involved in the offense. The Act also
set up the distinction between "cocaine base" and other forms of
cocaine and established the 100:1 quantity ratio.'
22. SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT at 122: "Crack cocaine was first
mentioned in the media by the Los Angeles Times on November 25, 1984...."
23. Id. at 121: "Congressional urgency is chronicled in the legislative
history."
24. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. H1, ch. H1, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (1984) (codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994 & Supp. I 1995)).
25. SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT at 115.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 116.
28. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-190 (1986) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C. (1994)).
29. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181-4545 (1988) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 49 U.S.C. (1994)).
30. SENTENCING COMMISION REPoRT at 116.
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The Sentencing Commission's guidelines for drug offenses,
written after the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, followed the five-
and ten-year mandatory minimums established in the Act. As
outlined by the Sentencing Commission,"1 the penalties for first-
time offenders are:
Five-year mandatory Crack: 5 grams
minimum * Value: $225 to $750
* Number of doses: 10-50 or more.
Powder: 500 grams
" Value: $32,500 to $50,000
" Number of doses: 2,500 to 500032
Ten-year mandatory Crack: 50 grams or more.
minimum Powder: 5,000 grams or more.
Judges can impose sentences below the statutory minimums only
on motion of the government indicating that the defendant has
"substantially assisted in the prosecutions of other persons.
The existence of the 100:1 powder/crack disparity presents
questions as to the purpose of the extraordinarily harsh treat-
ment of crack offenses. Is crack really 100 times more dangerous
than cocaine in powder form - which is, after all, the source of
crack?' Or is there something especially insidious in the nature
of the crack cocaine trade that warrants such disparate treat-
ment? As the Sentencing Commission report concluded, a
sound policy rationale for such a steep differential is hard to
find.
Findings of the United States Sentencing Commission:
1995 Special Report to Congress
The rationales for the 100:1 disparity that emerge from the
legislative history of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 fall into five
categories, according to the Sentencing Commission's research.
First, "legislators thought crack to be 'intensely addictive,' and
31. Id. at iii.
32. "Viewed another way, the 500-gram quantity of powder cocaine that
can send one powder distributor to prison for five years can be distributed to
up to 89 different street dealers who ... could make enough crack to trigger
the five-year penalty for each defendant." Id. at 175.
33. Id. at 116.
34. Testifying at the Sentencing Commission's 1993 hearings, John J.
Brennan of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department
illustrated the problem: "[I]t takes fifteen minutes to turn powder cocaine into
crack cocaine - a box of baking soda, a pot of water, and a microwave or a
stove, and you have crack cocaine." I& at 201.
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'quite possibly the most addictive drug on Earth.'"3 5 Second,
members of Congress saw crack cocaine as causing an increase in
serious crime.36 Third, members believed there was a substantive
difference in physiological effects of crack versus other forms of
cocaine."' Fourth, members were acting on the belief that young
people were especially at risk of becoming crack users, given the
portability and low price of doses of crack.3 ' And fifth, Congress
thought the totality of factors characteristic of crack - its low
cost, purity and potency, and ease of manufacture and distribu-
tion - were leading to widespread use.5 9
Examining these rationales, the Sentencing Commission
found little support for the 100:1 disparity.
First, the Commission concluded, though cocaine is not
physiologically addictive, using the drug in any form can create
psychological addiction.' Addiction is more likely to result from
casual use of crack than from casual use of powder cocaine, but
"[t]hat this is so, however, is not due to the difference in the
chemical makeup of the two substances, but instead results from
the method of administration associated with each."4' The use
of cocaine creates essentially the same physiological response no
matter what form the drug takes. But the intensity and duration
of the effects differ based on the form, and smoking crack
cocaine creates more intense, shorter effects than does use of
powder cocaine. "[T] he greater the intensity of these effects and
the shorter their duration, the greater the likelihood cocaine use
will lead to dependence and abuse."4'
35. Id. at 180.
36. Id
37. Id. at 181.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 24-25: "Unlike some drugs, cocaine is not physiologically
addicting," but because of its euphoric effects, "[c]ocaine exhibits powerful
reinforcing properties that cause users compulsively to misuse the drug
resulting in psychological addition." In other words, cessation of cocaine abuse
will not cause the physiological symptoms of withdrawal (anxiety, fever, chills,
and so forth) associated with nicotine or opiates, which are deemed physically
addictive; but the euphoric effects of the drug are so powerful that users tend to
increase frequency and quantity of use in order to continue to experience the
euphoria the drug produces. "Once the individual seeks treatment for
dependence, the distinction between physiological and psychological
dependence becomes irrelevant..." Id. at 25-26.
41. Id. at 181.
42. Id. at 182.
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But powder cocaine can always be easily converted into
crack,4' making it difficult to establish a punishment enhance-
ment based on form. "[Tihe higher addictive qualities associ-
ated with crack combined with its inherent ease of use can
support a higher ratio for crack over powder," the Commission
concluded, but "determining the precise magnitude of that ratio
based on the available evidence is difficult.""
Next, the Commission evaluated the correlation between
crack and crime, both violent and non-violent, cited in the legis-
lative history as a reason for the disparity. The Commission
applied a tripartite framework developed by Dr. Paul Goldstein
of the University of Illinois School of Public Health, classifying
drug-related crimes as "systemic crime, psychopharmacologically
driven crime, and economically compulsive crime."45 Systemic
crime is associated with turf wars, violent competition between
rival criminal hierarchies, and economic regulation and control
in illicit markets. As one expert testified at a Sentencing Com-
mission hearing, in an "underground economy, you can't sue.
So you use violence to enforce your breaches of contract or per-
ceived breaches of contract. " ' This appears to be the form of
crime most closely connected to the crack cocaine industry, for
two reasons: "First, crack selling was concentrated in neighbor-
hoods where social controls have been weakened by intensified
social and economic dislocations .... Second, the rapid devel-
opment of new drug-selling groups, following the introduction of
crack, brought with it competition."4
7
The second form of crime, psychopharmacologically driven
offenses, is the result of irrational behavior or violence due to the
effect of the drug. The "limited evidence to date suggests that
[this type of crime] may be least important in explaining the
association between crime and both crack and powder
cocaine,"' according to the Sentencing Commission's research.
43. "Crack cocaine... is derived from powder cocaine.... The powder
cocaine is simply dissolved in a solution of sodium bicarbonate and water. The
solution is boiled and a solid substance separates from the boiling mixture.
This solid substance, crack cocaine, is removed and allowed to dry. .. . One
gram of pure powder cocaine will convert to approximately 0.89 grams of crack
cocaine." Id. at 14.
44. Id. at 183.
45. Id. at 94.
46. Id. at 95.
47. Id. at 97, quoting a 1990 study by Jeffrey Fagan and Ko-lin Chin,
Viwlence as Regulation and Social Control in the Distribution of Crack, in DRUGS AND
VIOLENCE: CAUSES, CORRELATES, AND CONSEQUENCES, M. de la Rosa et al. eds.,
(1990).
48. Sentencing Commission Report at 99.
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Data on the third form, economically compulsive crime,
which is criminal behavior undertaken to finance personal drug
use, indicate that approximately forty-eight percent of male and
sixty-two percent of female crack cocaine users have committed
an average of one petty property crime such as shoplifting per
week, but that most of the economically compulsive crimes
related to crack tend to be either retail crack cocaine sales or
increased involvement in prostitution.4' These crimes, however,
are also associated with powder forms of cocaine, as well as other
illicit drugs. The Commission, noting that crack defendants tend
to have worse criminal records than powder cocaine defendants,
concluded:
While these numbers show that crack defendants typi-
cally have more serious criminal records than other drug
defendants, the guidelines already increase an offender's
sentence based on the severity and recency of his/her rec-
ord. As a result, some offenders are punished further
under the guidelines for behavior previously considered by
Congress in setting an increased ratio for crack offenses."0
A third reason cited in Congressional debate for the 100:1
disparity was the assumed higher correlation between crack use
and psychosis or death. This assumption was fueled, in part, by
the intense media coverage of the death of college basketball star
Len Bias. During the Senate hearing on crack cocaine use, Bias's
June, 1986, death was cited numerous times in connection with
crack, in spite of the fact that the cause of his death was use of
powder cocaine, not crack."' Reliable statistics on the incidence
of psychosis or death related to crack are scarce, partly because
medical data collection efforts either do not or cannot distin-
guish between different forms of the same chemical substance.
However, the majority of drug-related deaths involve combina-
tions of drugs; cocaine use "concurrent... with alcohol is the
most deadly combination," and one study of medical examiners'
data indicates that "injecting powder accounts for three times as
many deaths as smoking crack."5" Thus, the Commission con-
cluded, while crack use clearly can be life-threatening, the dan-
ger is comparable to use of cocaine in other forms, and available
49. Id. at 101-02.
50. Id. at 187.
51. Id. at 123; the report notes that about a year later, at the trial of the
man accused of supplying Bias with cocaine, another basketball player testified
that he and Bias and others had been snorting powder cocaine over a four-hour
period before Bias died; by this time, though, the "crack cocaine overdose
death of Len Bias" had become fixed in many minds.
52. Id. at 184.
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medical statistics do not support the 100:1 crack/powder sen-
tencing disparity.
Fourth was the concern that young people are more easily
drawn into use and distribution of crack. Available data show
that powder cocaine is more popular in all age brackets, but that
a higher proportion of young people who use cocaine use
crack.5"
[The] DEA cites the crack cocaine phenomenon as
responsible in large part for the increase in juvenile
involvement in drug trafficking. . . . Indeed, the street
level sale of crack requires little sophistication and lends
itself to the use of young people in a way that larger scale
and more "sophisticated" drug trafficking activities might
not.M
This suggests that the population most likely to encounter the
harshest penalties for cocaine distribution may be the very peo-
ple Congress sought to protect: younger people drawn into
street-level distribution.
Finally, members of Congress expressed concern about the
relationship between crack use and its affordability and ease of
transport. Ironically, media coverage of comedian Richard
Pryor's injuries from freebasing cocaine (Pryor suffered third-
degree burns over his torso and face)55 was effective free advertis-
ing for the crack industry: powder cocaine can be converted to
crack and smoked without the dangerous, flammable solvents
required to free-base cocaine, thus reducing the risk of such acci-
dents. Crack is easier to transport in street-level quantities, easier
and safer to use, and salable in small, relatively inexpensive units.
Like toothpaste in a stand-up tube or individually sized portions
of food products, the invention of crack represented a marketing
innovation. Crack was a new way for cocaine distributors to pack-
age their product and present it at a lower price point, and it
came along just in time to revitalize flagging interest and expand
cocaine use into new markets:
[A]s a glut of powder cocaine developed in the early to
mid-1980s, prices for both powder cocaine and crack
cocaine fell .... Consequently, retail crack cocaine distrib-
utors developed new marketing strategies, the most signifi-
53. Id. at 187. The Commission's research revealed that of cocaine users
in the year surveyed (1991), 26.7% of 12- to 17-year-olds used crack, compared
to 13% of 18- to 25-year-olds, 15.7% of 26- to 34-year-olds, and 21.4% of cocaine
users 35 or older.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 188.
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cant of which involved selling crack in single-dosage units,
in plastic vials or baggies, weighing between 0.1 and 0.5
grams apiece, affordably priced from $5 to $20. In con-
trast, powder cocaine was sold typically by the gram -
between five and ten doses - for less affordable prices
($65-$100). The affordability of crack cocaine expanded
its consumer base to lower income individuals.16
Converting powder cocaine to crack and selling it in smaller
amounts made the drug available to a broader customer base,
thus making use of the drug more pervasive. But this packaging
technique typically comes into play at the tail end of the drug
distribution chain. The conversion of powder cocaine to crack,
which can be accomplished by "anyone with access to baking
soda and water," most often takes place in the neighborhoods in
which the drug will be marketed, in a "breakthrough [that]
decentralized the manufacturing process for crack cocaine and
permitted demand to be met by retail dealers or even consumers
themselves."57
It is illogical to attempt to halt the spread of crack cocaine
by punishing low-level retail or street dealers, who can be imme-
diately replaced, more harshly than the mid-level retail or whole-
sale dealers who bring the drug to the point of sale in powder
form. More to the point, the tough-sounding mandatory
sentences passed in the mid-1980s have not reduced the drug
trade. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent to stop
the flow of cocaine, yet "distribution remains so successful that
wholesale cocaine prices are actually lower than they were in the
early 1980s. "58
II. JUDICIAL RESISTANCE TO IMPOSING SENTENCES EMBODYING
THE 100-To-1 DisPARIT
Many federal judges, both in district and appellate courts,
have responded to the 100:1 sentencing disparity with reluctant
enforcement of mandatory sentences or outright refusal to sen-
tence defendants in accordance with the guidelines or statutory
minimums.
In Pittsburgh, District Judge Donald E. Ziegler called the
harsh crack-cocaine penalties under the Sentencing Commission
guidelines "arbitrary and capricious" and refused to apply them
in the case of Darnell Lee Alton, considered to be a "heavy crack
56. Id. at 188-89.
57. Id. at 76.
58. Linnet Myers, Decade of Destruction: Losing a Generation of Youths to
Crack, Cm. TRm., Dec. 31, 1995 (Perspective), at 1.
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cocaine trafficker."59 Judge Ziegler sentenced Alton to ten years
in prison followed by five years of parole, a sentence that com-
ported with guidelines for powder cocaine, not crack. He justi-
fied the departure by pointing out that Congress had
reconsidered the rationality of the 100:1 ratio, that the Sentenc-
ing Commission acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in
setting the crack cocaine penalties, and that the Commission did
not adequately consider the potential for racially disparate
impact when developing the guidelines.'
In Omaha, District Judge Lyle Strom departed from the
guidelines in sentencing two crack-cocaine defendants, justifying
his departure by the racially disparate impact of the guideline-
mandated sentences. Reversing, the appellate court stated that a
"downward departure is not justified" simply because the Sen-
tencing Commission did not consider the potential for racially
disparate impact in setting the crack cocaine penalties.61
In the District of Columbia, DistrictJudge Harold H. Greene
railed against sentencing guidelines in general, as well as police
power to "manipulate these statutes and guidelines so as to
achieve ends that may not be consistent with justice," 2 in con-
nection with the case of Sharon Shepherd. Shepherd had
offered an undercover officer a quantity of powder cocaine, but
the officer asked the defendant to convert it into crack because
he wanted to trigger the harsher crack-cocaine penalties. The
sentencing guidelines mandated a sentence of 120 to 135
months once the cocaine was converted to crack, as compared to
a sentence of sixty months had the drugs remained in powder
form.63 Judge Greene wrote:
This case demonstrates that, because of the mandatory
minimum sentences and the rigid sentencing guidelines,
effective control of sentencing - from time immemorial
in common law countries a judicial function - has effec-
tively slipped, at least in some cases, not only to the realm
59. United States v. Alton, 60 F.3d 1065, 1066 (3rd Cir. 1995); the Third
Circuit vacated the sentence imposed by Judge Ziegler, remanding for
resentencing within the guideline ranges and deferring "to Congress and the
Sentencing Commission to address the related policy issues and to consider the
wisdom of retaining the present sentencing scheme." Id. at 1071.
60. Id. at 1067 et seq.
61. United States v. Majied, 25 F.3d 1389, 1400 (8th Cir. 1994).
62. United States v. Shepherd, 857 F.Supp. 105, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1994),
remanded, 102 F.3d 558 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The appellate court remanded the
case with instructions to vacate Shepherd's judgment of conviction, allow her to
enter a plea, and be resentenced; the lower court had rejected a mid-trial plea
bargain.
63. Id. at 106.
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of the prosecution but even further to that of the police.
This development denies due process and is intolerable in
our Constitutional system.64
In Atlanta, U.S. District Judge J. Owen Forrester called his
own chemistry experts to testify at an evidentiary hearing, then
found that "the penalty provisions of § 841 set out a scientifically
meaningless distinction between cocaine and cocaine base, and
that the heightened penalty provision for cocaine base must be
ignored by operation of the rule of lenity."' Judge Forrester,
characterized as a "Reagan appointee with a reputation for tough
sentences,"' found that "cocaine and cocaine base are synony-
mous terms referring to the same substance having the same
molecular structure, molecular weight and melting point"867
Looking at the legislative history of § 841, he noted that "the
statutory provisions that are at issue ... were passed with much
fanfare and little debate"' and concluded that "there is no
rational basis for having heightened penalties for cocaine or
cocaine base derived only by one means of manufacture, when it
is clear beyond doubt that all forms of cocaine are equally smoka-
ble and, therefore, equally dangerous."69
In the Eighth Circuit, Senior Circuit Judge Gerald W.
Heaney concurred in affirming the sentence of Carl Travis Net-
ter, who pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute
both cocaine and cocaine base (crack), triggering the statutory
minimum sentence.70 But Judge Heaney's concurrence sug-
gested that Congress had no rational basis in establishing the
crack cocaine penalties:
I concur in the court's opinion, but only because I am
bound by our prior decisions. I continue to believe that
Congress did not have a rational basis to treat one gram of
crack cocaine as equivalent to 100 grams of powder
cocaine. [Citations omitted.] What makes matters worse is
that the crack laws have a disparate impact on blacks.
Until our court en banc or the Supreme Court overrules
our prior cases, however, I must concur.71
64. Id. at 105.
65. United States v. Davis, 864 F. Supp. 1303, 1309 (N.D.Ga. 1994).
66. Judge Rejets Basisfor Crack Sentences, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 12, 1994, atA10.
67. 864 F. Supp. at 1306.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1309.
70. United States v. Netter, 977 F.2d 586 (8th Cir. 1992).
71. Id.
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Senior DistrictJudge Howard F. Sachs, in a sentencing mem-
orandum from the Western District of Missouri, expressed simi-
lar frustration:
Federal judges appear to be uniformly appalled by the
severe crack cocaine punishments, particularly as com-
pared with the more moderate punishments mandated for
transactions in ordinary, powdered cocaine. If Justice
Anthony Kennedy is correctly quoted in a current AP dis-
patch, he has just advised a Congressional Appropriations
Committee that, "I simply do not see how Congress can be
satisfied with the results of mandatory minimums for pos-
session of crack cocaine." New York Times, March 10,
1994. Even if this wording is inexact, I am aware of no
federal judge who does not share the sentiment expressed.
... Seeing the wholesale commitment of African American
defendants to extraordinarily long terms of imprisonment
for crack cocaine trafficking, where severe but less shock-
ing sentences are imposed on others for trafficking in pow-
dered cocaine in comparable amounts, rubs many judicial
nerves raw.
72
And in Manhattan, Second Circuit Judge Guido Calabresi,
though concurring with the court's rejection of a challenge
based on both equal protection and double-counting in the sen-
tencing of Manuel Then, added:
The unfavorable and disproportionate impact that the 100-
to-1 crack/cocaine sentencing ratio has on members of
minority groups is deeply troubling. [Citations omitted.]
... But what is known today about the effects of crack
and cocaine, and about the impact that the crack/cocaine
sentencing rules have on minority groups, is significantly
different from what was known when the 100-to-1 ratio was
adopted. As a result, constitutional arguments that were
unavailing in the past may not be foreclosed in the future.
[New statistical information] might change the consti-
tutional status of the current ratio. If Congress ... were
nevertheless to act affirmatively and negate the Commis-
sion's proposed amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines
• . subsequent equal protection challenges based on
claims of discriminatory purpose might well lie.73
Attorney Lloyd Epstein, a New York criminal law practi-
tioner, summarized the situation: "All of us who practice regu-
72. United States v. Conard, 1994 WL 90356, at *2-3 (W.D.Mo. 1994).
73. United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 467-68 (2d Cir. 1995).
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larly in the federal courts, including prosecutors and probation
officials, have become frustrated with the harshness and irration-
ality of the crack cocaine Sentencing Guidelines."7 4
A. Media Influence on Legislative Debate
White fear, real or imagined, impinges mightily on black reality.
What's more, white fear and the myths that accompany it; myths
such as blacks' supposed penchant for violence, blacks' supposed
lack of intellect, and blacks' alleged moral depravity are why many
whites presume that the face of everything they frar - violence, los-
ing their jobs, or not getting into college - is black.7'
The Sentencing Commission's research shows that the vari-
ous rationales on which the crack cocaine penalties were based
may justify some disparate treatment of crack offenders, but they
do not provide a rational basis for the 100:1 disparity. How,
then, did Congress decide that crack cocaine was 100 times more
dangerous than the same drug in powder form? Did elements of
media stereotyping and unconscious racial fear taint the legisla-
tive process?
In a complicated and diverse society, most of us form our
impressions of the nationwide social reality based on what we
learn from watching television, listening to the radio, reading
newspapers and magazines - in other words, from the media.
The stories presented in news programming, talk shows,
entertainment programs, and print media are necessarily distilla-
tions of actual events. Every story that appears on the nightly
news represents one or more reporters' perceptions as to what
details are relevant, what background is significant, and what is
superfluous. A story's presence in the news lineup represents the
programming and gatekeeping decisions of editors. And every
story that makes the front page or the six o'clock news, by its very
presence, squeezes out other possible stories, other views of what
is important. News gathering and news reporting are human
functions that reflect a chain of decisions filtering, selecting,
interpreting, and omitting.
Harold Lasswell, a political science and communications
scholar who wrote extensively on the media, public relations,
propaganda, and the role of public opinion in preserving democ-
74. Lloyd Epstein, Crack Cocaine Stencing Guidelines Challenged, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 27, 1995, "Outside Counsel," at 1.
75. Betty Winston Baye, Talking with the Prsident About Race, Loutsvnu
CouPmR-JotNAL, Nov. 9, 1995, at 13A, available in 1995 WL 2340111.
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racy,76 noted three functions of the mass media: "surveillance of
the environment, the correlation of the parts of society in
responding to the environment, and the transmission of the
social heritage from one generation to the next."77 Surveillance
includes deciding what is news or worth presenting as entertain-
ment; correlation involves selecting and interpreting informa-
tion; transmitting culture involves communicating and modeling
values and norms. But in addition to such neutral core func-
tions, the media may also have dysfunctions, or effects that are
undesirable for society.
78
George Gerbner, University of Pennsylvania professor and
dean emeritus of the Annenberg School of Communication, has
conducted long-term research that documents ways in which tele-
vision, in particular, shapes our perceptions of what, out there, is
"real." According to Gerbner, we live in a world created by narra-
tives; our notion of reality is "put together from the stories we
hear."79 And the stories we hear today, from both news and
enterainment programming, are rough indeed, delivered with
immediacy and visual impact impossible before the advent of tel-
evision and movies. As Gerbner sees it:
Humankind may have had more bloodthirsty eras, but
none as filled with images of violence as the present. We
are awash in a tide of violent representations the world has
never seen. Of course, there is blood in fairy tales, gore in
mythology, murder in Shakespeare. Violence is a legiti-
mate cultural expression, even necessary to show the con-
sequences of deadly conflicts and lethal compulsions. But
the historically limited, individually crafted and selectively
used symbolic violence of great drama and good journal-
ism, often conveying a tragic sense of life essential for
human compassion, has been swamped by "happy vio-
lence": no pain, no permanent damage, just swift, effective,
sanitized entertainment leading to happy endings .... And
in nearly all of us, but especially in heavy TV users, lifelong
exposure to images of violence generates a sense of insecu-
rity and a demand for repression (more jails, more execu-
tions, more global policing) as long as it can be justified as
76. See, e.g., HAROLD D. LAsswELL, DEMOCRACY THROUGH PUBLIC OPINION
(1941).
77. WERNER J. SEVERIN & JAMES W. TANKARD, JR., COMMUNICATION
THEORIEs: ORIGINS, METHODS, AND USES IN THE MASS MEDIA, 293 (3rd ed. 1988).
78. Id. Severin and Tankard point out that a single act "may be both
functional and dysfunctional," as well.
79. Charles M. Madigan, Crime Report, PITTSBURGH PosT-GAzETrE, Dec. 26,
1993, at B1.
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enhancing our security. ... For the first time in history,
most of the stories in our society are being told not by par-
ents, schools, churches or communities with something to
tell, but increasingly by global conglomerates with some-
thing to sell.80
Often, the face we see on television linked with drug use,
crime, or the criminal justice system, is black.81 And that image
is less frequently counter-balanced with images of the construc-
tive, non-criminal activities of blacks. Consider "the walk:"
Staged with varying frequency by area police departments
and broadcast routinely on local TV newscasts, the walk is a
kind of law-and-order photo opportunity designed to pro-
vide television with moving pictures of captured criminals.
The police notify the media when the criminals will be
walked, and photographers are dispatched to get footage
for evening newscasts or the next edition of the newspaper.
"If they walk 'em," WWL [New Orleans] News Direc-
tor Joe Duke said, "we shoot 'em. It's that simple. If you
live in this town, that is the rule. That has always been."
But this parade of criminals, the majority of them
poor and black, does more social harm than journalistic
good, critics charge. It perpetuates an image of the savage
black man and generates among white viewers racist feel-
ings and fear.
Those feelings are exacerbated by the comparatively
few images of black people engaged in constructive, non-
criminal activity, said George Gerbner. ... "It is a combi-
nation of the invisibility of well-rounded black life and the
high-crime visibility ....
Gerbner, over the course of two decades, has tracked what
he dubs the "mean world" effect"83 Among those who are catego-
80. George Gerbner, Road Runner Begets Rambo, NEwsDAY, Feb. 26, 1993,
at 54.
81. Together. . Apart: 7e Myth of Race, Tlms-PicAv UN, Sept. 13, 1993, at
A9.
82. Id.
83. Gerbner and co-investigator Larry Gross began tracking television
violence in 1967, producing a "TV Violence Profile" of the prevalence, rate, and
characterizations of violence on television programs. Consistently, they found
that "[h]eavy viewers revealed a significantly higher sense of personal risk, of
law-enforcement, and of mistrust and suspicion than did light viewers in the
same demographic groups, exposed to the same real risks of life. The results
also showed that TWs independent contributions to the cultivation of these
conceptions of a 'mean world' and other aspects of social reality are not
significantly altered by sex, age, education, income, newspaper reading, and
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rized as heavy television viewers, the "mean world" effect is "an
exaggerated sense of insecurity and vulnerability":
They believe, incorrectly, that it is riskier to ride the ele-
vated train or the subway than it is to ride in a car. Even in
their homes in communities that are not threatened by the
violence they read, view and hear about, they feel unsafe.
Unfortunately, this syndrome also plays its part in public
policy because it helps create a "demand" from politicians
for "solutions" to the "problem." "There is a demand for
more hard-nosed judges," Gerbner said. "For more pris-
ons. For more capital punishment. For more of the things
that have never worked.""
Gerbner sees abundant evidence that what lawmakers "actually
attacked [in anti-crime measures] was not the causes of crime,
but public perceptions about crime."85
The story-telling power of the media can create a perception
of reality tilted by bias, even when, operating with the best of
motives, journalists narrate stories intended to reveal neglect and
suffering in society. That narrative power - the power to
describe and thereby define the world we live in - can create
powerful public anxieties 6 that find their way into legislative
policy.
B. Equal Protection: Levels of Scrutiny
Virtually all government actions or regulations classify some-
thing or someone on some basis. The Court currently analyzes
equal protection questions, whether they arise under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 7 by three tests:
church attendance." GEORGE GERBNER, ET AL., VIOLENCE PRoFILE No. 8, 1
(Annenberg School of Communications, March 1977).
84. Madigan, supra note 79.
85. Id.
86. Heavy television viewers in particular tend to harbor perceptions that
reflect the way the world is presented on TV. For example, when asked what
they think their chances are of being involved in some type of violence in any
given week, heavy television viewers are more likely to approach the answer that
would be suggested by TV programming (10 percent) rather than the correct
answer of I percent or less. Asked "Can people be trusted," heavy TV viewers
are more likely to respond with an answer such as "Can't be too careful."
Gerbner's research indicates that heavy TV viewers in particular gain a
heightened sense of risk and threat, leading to greater insecurity - the
perception that it's a "mean world" out there. SEvxlN & TANxmm, supra note
77, at 249.
87. The Fourteenth Amendment is limited by its terms to actions by state
governments. But the Court has held that most actions by the federal
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"'rational basis' scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scru-
tiny. "8 Under rational basis review, a classification is valid if it is
rationally related to a constitutionally permissible government
interest; under intermediate scrutiny, a classification will be held
impermissible unless it is substantially related to an important
government interest; and under strict scrutiny, a classification
will be held to violate equal protection unless it is necessary to
promote a compelling government interest. All racial classifica-
tions, "imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental
actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scru-
tiny... [and must be] narrowly tailored measures that further
compelling governmental interests."89
Washington v. Davis holds that in order to invalidate a statute
under strict scrutiny, a court must find that the statute was
designed with a specifically discriminatory purpose or intent 9
But insistence on an overtly discriminatory purpose overlooks the
powerful influence of unconscious racism. Where a racially dis-
parate impact of clear significance emerges, as has happened in
the case of the penalties for crack cocaine,9 courts need to be
empowered to look more deeply into the causes of the disparity.
Courts need an analytical structure that allows exploration of the
potential for unconscious racism either in the legislative process
or in the public sentiment behind legislative choice.
District Judge Clyde S. Cahill of the Eastern District of Mis-
souri, in United States v. Clary,92 applies such an analytical
approach. His decision is a meticulous study of the effects of
racially stereotypical media coverage of crack cocaine as related
to the timing of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.
C. United States v. Claiy
In January of 1994, Edward James Clary, an 18-year-old black
man with no prior convictions, 93 was sentenced for possession
with intent to distribute 67.76 grams of crack cocaine. He had
entered a guilty plea pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1) (A) (iii)
government that would be similar denials of equal protection are deprivations
of liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
88. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2269 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
89. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995).
90. 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also infra text accompanying note 129.
91. Morley, supra note 6.
92. 846 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
93. Id. at 797.
94. Id. at 770.
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(the anti-drug abuse statutory section relevant to crack cocaine),
but then challenged the statute's mandatory ten-year minimum
sentence and sentence enhancements as a violation of his equal
protection rights.95 Under these provisions, a person convicted
of possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of
crack cocaine receives no less than ten years in prison; the
amount of powder cocaine necessary to trigger the same sen-
tence is 5000 grams, or 4932.24 more grams of cocaine than
Clary possessed. This provision, according to Judge Cahill, "has
been directly responsible for incarcerating nearly an entire gen-
eration of young black American men for very long periods, usu-
ally during the most productive time of their lives" while their
white counterparts, who are more likely to be associated with
powder cocaine, are punished far less harshly.96 The impact of
this statute, he wrote, "is so significantly disproportional that it
shocks the conscience of the Court and invokes examination.
As a result, he sentenced Clary under the guidelines for powder
cocaine, departing upwards for the aggravating factors of fore-
thought and planning. The result was a prison sentence of four
years, followed by three years of supervised release.9"
Judge Cahill's thoroughly researched decision was in part a
reply to a challenge from the Eighth Circuit in United States v.
Marsha&ll In Marshal, the Court of Appeals reversed a down-
ward departure from the sentencing guidelines in a case involv-
ing a marijuana grower, but the appellate court's distaste for the
task was evident:
We are compelled to reverse for resentencing, although
we acknowledge skepticism about the rationale used by the
Sentencing Commission. Disagreement with the Guide-
lines does not justify a departure. [Citations omitted.] An
impression that an arbitrary and capricious factor has
become embedded in the Guidelines may well, however,
justify further consideration, on remand, of the constitu-
tional validity of the Guideline provision .... '00
In a footnote, the court acknowledged that it had rejected,
in United States v. Buckner,101 a challenge based on a cruel-and-
unusual-punishment argument to the "more extraordinary dis-
parity" between sentences for cocaine powder and cocaine base.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 797.
99. 998 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1993).
100. Id. at 635.
101. 894 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1990).
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The court then noted how troubling such sentencing disparities
have become, inviting a deeper inquiry into the issues:
With so much at stake, however, in this and other cases, we
are reluctant to say that full exploration of the issues is
unwarranted, either in this case or in connection with the
crack cocaine punishments, which continue to perplex
many sentencing judges. We do not invite mere repetition
of prior rejected arguments, without new facts or legal
analysis. 102
Judge Cahill set out to present this new legal analysis in
Clay.105 The core of his argument is that "race rather than con-
duct was the determining factor"' °4 when Congress established
the 100:1 disparity. This happened because the public and
(through public pressure) Congress were influenced by a bar-
rage of media attention to the sudden surge of crack cocaine use,
overwhelmingly portraying young black males as the source of
spreading violence and danger. Through a steady "drum beat"
of crime news and dramatizations of violent crime, creating such
public fear and rage that the public "is prepared - no, anxious
- to pay any price to control crime even to the abandonment of
traditional constitutional safeguards,"1"5 Congress was pressured
into moving with unusual haste and insufficient reflection. The
pressure on legislators, said Judge Cahill, led to "a feeding frenzy
of responses from lawmakers of every stripe and political persua-
sion, so that both Congress and state legislators fill the hoppers
with proposed bills designed to curtail crime (each one more
restrictive or Draconian than those before) in the misguided
hope of reducing crime, but in the certainty that, effective or
not, it will gain votes."10 6 Concluding that the pertinent sections
of 21 U.S.C. § 841 violate equal protection, Judge Cahill held
that Clary had been the victim of race-based prosecutorial selec-
tion as well.10 7
Judge Cahill's analysis recognizes the powerful perceptions
that are created in the public mind by the story-telling role of the
media. These public perceptions, even when they are based on
erroneous or incomplete information, can nevertheless create
such pressure on legislators that neutrality is unknowingly aban-
doned, and unconscious bias creeps into the law.
102. 998 F.2d at 635.
103. 846 F. Supp. at 771.
104. Id. at 770.
105. Id. at 771.
106. Id. at 772.
107. "Prosecution based on race is obviously discriminatory even if it is
occasioned by unconsdous racism," Judge Cahill wrote. I&. at 797.
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At the outset, Judge Cahill sought to defuse the inevitable
criticism that his decision would be portrayed as "soft on crime:"
[L]et this be perfectly clear. This Court does not condone
crime in any form or by any class or group . . . . This
Court recognizes that the control of crime is the most
important goal of sentencing, and a firm and certain pun-
ishment must be the major goal in criminal justice. How-
ever, such punishment must be fair; it must fit the
particulars of the offense and must acknowledge character-
istics of individuals."' 8
Overt racism on the part of lawmakers may be a thing of the past,
Judge Cahill wrote, but punishment that so manifestly falls on
blacks, even though facially neutral, harms "the credibility of gov-
ernment among black citizens," eroding their faith that "equal
justice is for all."109
Equal protection analysis traditionally reserves strict scrutiny
for legislative classifications involving presumptively suspect fac-
tors, such as race, or fundamental liberties. The difficulty the
court faces in a case such as this, where the statute is facially neu-
tral, yet clearly has a disparate impact, is to determine if the stat-
ute was "enacted for racial reasons. "110 Judge Cahill invoked
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 111
in which officials of a predominantly white, upper-middle-class
suburb of Chicago opposed a plan for construction of low-
income housing by refusing to rezone the proposed site to allow
multi-family units. Though the Supreme Court ultimately
rejected the black plaintiffs' equal protection claim on the
grounds that they failed to prove conscious discriminatory intent,
the Court did outline a methodology for inquiring into "such cir-
cumstantial evidence of intent as may be available." 1 2 Arlington
sets forth these factors: "the presence of disparate impact, the
overall historical context of the legislation, the legislative history
of the challenged law, and departures from the normal legislative
process." Precedent also exists for adding criteria such as fore-
seeability of the consequences of the legislation.'1
Evaluating the sentencing disparities embodied in 21 U.S.C.
§ 841 in the light of these factors, Judge Cahill found that consid-
eration of each factor revealed problems.
108. Id. at 772.
109. Id. at 773.
110. Id.
111. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
112. Id. at 266.
113. 846 F. Supp. at 773.
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Judge Cahill began by tracing the history of the media's role
in creating climates of crisis that have led lawmakers in different
eras to enact drug-control legislation that disparately affected
minorities:
Prior to the civil rights era, Congress repeatedly
imposed severe criminal sanctions on addictive substances
once they became popular with minorities. Historically, a
consortium of reactionary media and a subsequently
inflamed constituency have combined to influence Con-
gress ... 114
For example, he wrote, the 1909 Smoking Opium Exclusion
Act 15 was a response to public opinion that had been inflamed
over the years by lurid media accounts of the supposed spread of
opium smoking beyond the Chinese community. 116 The Harri-
son Act of 1914,117 the first federal law prohibiting distribution
of cocaine and heroin, was "passed on the heels of overblown
media accounts depicting heroin-addicted black prostitutes and
criminals in the cities." It followed Congressional debate in
which the sponsor explained that he included coca leaves in the
bill because the leaves make Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola "and all
those things are sold to Negroes all over the South.""' It was
supported by an official report that warned Congress about drug-
crazed southern blacks whose drug habits threatened to infect
"the higher social ranks of the country."" 9 The Marijuana Tax
Act 2 0 was enacted in 1937 after a successful media campaign
waged by the then-Commissioner of the Treasury Department's
Bureau of Narcotics, who used the media as a forum to depict
"insane violence which he alleged resulted from marijuana
use."121
Yet when cocaine use first began to spread again in the
1970s and 1980s, no new laws were enacted. "The social history is
clear that so long as cocaine powder was a popular amusement
114. Id. at 775.
115. 21 U.S.C. §§ 176-185 (1909) (repealed 1970).
116. For example: "[T]he Chinaman has impoverished our country,
degraded our free labor, and hoodlumized our children. He is now destroying
our young men with opium." 846 F. Supp. at 775, quoting the SAN FRANcISCO
PosT, Mar. 1, 1879.
117. 26 U.S.C. §§ 211, 691-707 (1914) (repealed 1970).
118. 846 F. Supp. at 775 (quoting Rep. Francis Harrison, author of the
Harrison Act).
119. Id.
120. Ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551 (1937).
121. 846 F. Supp. at 775.
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among young, white professionals, law enforcement policy
prohibiting cocaine was weakly enforced,"122 Judge Cahill wrote.
Then came the mid-1980s. Judge Cahill painted the back-
drop against which the spread of crack cocaine occurred:
The smoke-stack industries which furnished considera-
ble highly paid employment to many persons with limited
formal education were dead, dying, or moving elsewhere
[in the mid-1980s]. . . . [A] pervasive opinion grew that
government had to curtail spending... [1]ocal and state
governments were getting less and less money returned...
community projects such as hospitals, playgrounds, emer-
gency shelters, and food pantries were closed
[u]nemployment reached levels as high as 8 percent
nationally but in the inner cities it hovered around 20 per-
cent and in some cases soared to 50 to 60 percent among
young black men.1 28
In this climate, he argued, many young black men lost hope and
motivation. Crack cocaine gave them instant access to cash. It
was an easy option to young men with few choices in life.
124
"It must be noted," Judge Cahill wrote, "that in the early
years of the drug war few paid attention to the escalating violence
among these competing gangs because they were then only kill-
ing each other or an occasional hapless victim who lived nearby."
When the violence associated with competition for share of the
crack market began to expand out of the inner cities, govern-
ment acted. But even then, law enforcement concentrated on
confining the violence to inner cities. Judge Cahill cited a 1987
incident in which police tried to isolate residents of the predomi-
nantly black East St. Louis, Illinois, by blocking the bridge across
the Mississippi connecting it to St Louis, Missouri, thus prevent-
ing them from reaching a Fourth of July celebration across the
river. 12
Unconscious racism has replaced the overt racism of Jim
Crow days, according to Judge Cahill:
Picture a city where it is easier to buy cocaine than it is
to purchase a loaf of bread. Imagine a town that discour-
122. Id.
123. Id. at 777.
124. Some drug gangs control a greater cash flow than many Fortune 500
companies: for instance, the "DEA estimates that the Jamaican Posses [a street
gang originally composed ofJamaican immigrants but now containing a mix of
Hispanic and black youth as well] gross $1 billion in drug proceeds annually."
SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT at 87.
125. 846 F. Supp. at 778.
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ages those who could be role models by denying them
mortgages and loans to improve their homes. Think of a
community where mothers, barely more than children
themselves, serve as one-parent heads of households in a
world without fathers. . . . Remember the children who
rarely see a doctor, lawyer, or teacher as a neighbor and
whose only source of inspiration is a chain bedecked drug
peddler.
These portraits of misery and degradation are the
daily world of the inner city resident and are all, part and
parcel, products of unconscious racism. . . . The terror of
long prison terms has little deterrence for [those who live
there] - their life is already a prison of despair.126
Intentional discrimination may have disappeared or gone under-
ground, but "benign neglect for the harmful impact or fallout
upon the black community that might ensue from decisions
made by the white community for the 'greater good' of society
has replaced intentional discrimination." 127 This is the kind of
unconscious, unintentional racism that is patently evident in the
crack cocaine statutes.
Again, narratives woven by the media contributed to form-
ing public perceptions of social reality-
[A] fearful white class afraid to encounter a black man
results from [whites] never being exposed to positive
images of black America. Given the racially segregated
nature of American economic and social life, the media
has played an important role in the construction of a
national image of black male youth as "the criminal" in two
significant respects which serve to enhance penalties for
crack cocaine violators: 1) generating public panic regard-
ing crack cocaine; and 2) associating black males with
crack cocaine. Ergo, the decision maker who is unaware of
this selection perception will believe that his actions are
not motivated by racial prejudice. 128
If we are to unearth this kind of buried racial motivation,
Judge Cahill argued, traditional equal protection analysis is inad-
equate. Without a mechanism by which to consider the effects of
deeply buried, unconscious racial stereotyping, the strict scrutiny
requirement of a finding of discriminatory intent becomes an
impossible burden of proof.
126. Id. at 778.
127. Id. at 779.
128. Id. at 781.
EQUAL PROTECTION IN A MEAN WORLD
Judge Cahill employed a process of equal protection analysis
that considered the effects of unconscious racism, arguing that
"[r]acial influences which unconsciously seeped into the legisla-
tive decision making process are no less injurious, reprehensible,
or unconstitutional" than discriminatory intent.
Equal protection demands that similarly situated parties be
treated alike. Judge Cahill's launching point was Washington v.
Davis,l" a 1976 class action in which black applicants for jobs as
police officers challenged a written test on the basis of its dispa-
rate impact on minorities. "Test 21" was developed by the Civil
Service Commission to test verbal ability, vocabulary, reading,
and comprehension."s Yet it yielded four times as many black
failures as white failures, and administrators offered no evidence
to correlate performance on the test with success in police train-
ing or subsequent performance on the job.' Though the
Court, applying strict scrutiny, found no discriminatory purpose
behind Test 21, the majority nevertheless noted that racially dis-
criminatory purpose need not be express on the face of a statute,
nor is disproportionate impact irrelevant: "[n]ecessarily, an
invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the
totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that
the law bears more heavily on one race than another." 2
Washington v. Davis' requirement of discriminatory purpose
for invalidation of legislation focuses on the mental state of the
lawmaker, asking whether his or her intent was to discriminate.
Thus it has been described as introducing a "perpetrator per-
spective" on equal protection analysis: "In essence, Washington v.
Davis announced that henceforth every lawsuit involving consti-
tutional claims of racial discrimination directed at facially race-
neutral rules would be conducted as a search for a bigoted deci-
sion-maker."3 3 But as Judge Cahill noted, Washington says that
even without demonstrating that an individual or group overtly
harbored discriminatory intent, a challenger can make a prima
facie case for discrimination by showing that the totality of rele-
vant facts implies a discriminatory purpose. Whether the chal-
lenger should prevail then becomes an inquiry into the specifics
of the case and the available evidence of discriminatory intent.
"With a prima facie case made out, 'the burden of proof shifts to
the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by
showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and
129. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
130. Id. at 234-35.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 242.
133. Tribe, supra note 19, at 1509.
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procedures have produced the monochromatic result.' "1 4 In
other words, where a significant racially disparate impact has
been shown, and where there are other factors to suggest that
racial discrimination may have been a factor, the State can be
required to prove that a challenged statute or practice is neutral.
Judge Cahill then returned to the factors outlined in Arling-
ton in order to conduct his inquiry into the totality of relevant
circumstances: 1) adverse racial impact of the official action, 2)
historic background, 3) the sequence of events that led up to the
challenged actions, 4) any departures from normal decision-mak-
ing processes, 5) substantive departures from routine decisions,
6) statements made by decision-makers contemporary to the
decision, and 7) the foreseeability of the consequences.
The advent of crack cocaine was accompanied by saturation
coverage of crack in the media, coverage which connected crack
cocaine to black, inner-city youths and which generated enor-
mous public fear and outrage.ls Against this background, the
sequence of events leading to passage of the crack cocaine stat-
utes was anything but normal:
Crack cocaine eased into the mainstream about
1985 and immediately absorbed the media's attention. ....
Many of the stories were racist. Despite the statistical data
that whites were prevalent among crack users, rare was the
interview with a young black person who had avoided
drugs and the drug culture, and even rarer was any media
association with whites and crack. ... The media created a
stereotype of a crack dealer as a young black male, unem-
ployed, gang affiliated, gun toting, and a menace to soci-
ety. These stereotypical descriptions of drug dealers may
be accurate, but not all young black men are drug dealers.
The broad brush of uninformed public opinion paints
them all the same. 1 6
Did this media-drawn image of crack dealers as young black
men incite racial fears, resulting in sufficient public pressure to
taint lawmakers' decision-making process with racial bias? Judge
Cahill found evidence that it did: "Legislators used these media
accounts as informational support for the enactment of the crack
statute."1" 7 Members of Congress read article after article into
the Congressional Record, accounts that consistently portrayed
134. 426 U.S. 229 at 241 (1976) (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 US.
625, 632 (1972)).
135. SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT at 121-23.
136. 846 F. Supp. at 783.
137. Id.
EQUAL PROTECTION IN A MEAN WORLD
crack use as a surging epidemic and stereotyped crack dealers as
young black males and gang members.'-1 Some reports con-
tained language "that was either overtly or subtly racist, feeding
white fears that the 'crack problem' would spill out of the
ghettos." 5 9
In reaction to the pressure of public opinion generated by
this volume of reporting (over 400 broadcast reports by NBC
News alone in 1985 and 1986),140 Congress departed significantly
from its normal deliberative process. Tracking the "extraordina-
rily hasty and truncated" process involved in the 1986 Act, Judge
Cahill quoted Eric Sterling, counsel to the House Subcommittee
on Crime during 1986, in testimony at hearings held in 1993 by
the Sentencing Commission:
[In August of 1986] Speaker O'Neill returned from Boston
after the July 4th district work period where he had been
bombarded with constituent horror and outrage about the
cocaine overdose death of NCAA basketball star Len Bias
after signing with the championship Boston Celtics. The
Speaker announced that the House Democrats would
develop an omnibus anti-drug bill, easing the reelection
concerns of many Democratic members of the House by
ostensibly preempting the crime and drug issue from the
Republicans who had used it very effectively in the 1984
election season. The Speaker set a deadline ... five weeks
away.
The development of this omnibus bill was extraordi-
nary. Typically Members introduce bills which are referred
to a subcommittee, and hearings are held... [c]omment
is invited... [a] markup is held on a bill, and amendments
are offered to it. For this omnibus bill much of this proce-
dure was dispensed with. The careful deliberative practices
of the Congress were set aside for the drug bill. 4 '
With few facts and little research to go on, the House Crime Sub-
committee released a bill with a crack-to-powder ratio of 50:1.
This was doubled to 100:1 before passage, to emphasize the seri-
ousness of Congress's intent."42 In the Senate, despite the warn-
ings of some Senators alarmed at the fast-track path of the bill,
138. Id. at 783-84.
139. Id.
140. SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT at 122; both Time and Newsweek
wrote five cover stories on crack, and "Newsweek referred to crack as the biggest
news story since Vietnam and Watergate (June 16, 1986)." Id.
141. 846 F. Supp. at 784.
142. Id.
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just a single hearing of under four hours was held.143 Thus these
four Arlington factors - sequence of events leading up to the
legislation, departures from normal decision-making processes,
substantive departures from routine decisions, and contempora-
neous statements by decision-makers - suggest that the 100:1
sentencing disparity was the result of a suspect process. As a con-
sequence of these deviations from normal legislative processes,
Judge Cahill concluded, the 100:1 crack-to-powder ratio was the
"direct result of a 'frenzied' Congress that was moved to action
based upon an unconscious racial animus." ",
Regarding the foreseeability of the racially disparate impact
of the 100:1 sentencing disparity, Judge Cahill cited Columbus
Board of Education v. Penick"4 which addressed foreseeability of
disparate impact in the context of school desegregation. In
Penick, the appellate court affirmed a district court's finding that
schools in Columbus, Ohio, were racially segregated. The con-
tinuance of this segregated arrangement, after Brown v. Board of
Education had established an affirmative duty to desegregate
schools," was found to be the result of "purposefully segregative
practices" "" in spite of the school administrators' protestations
that they had no intent to discriminate:
[A] ctions having foreseeable and anticipated dispa-
rate impact are relevant evidence to prove the ultimate
fact, forbidden purpose .... Adherence to a particular
policy or practice, "with full knowledge of the predictable
effects of such adherence on racial imbalance... may be
considered by a court in determining whether an infer-
ence of [discriminatory] intent should be drawn."14
143. Sen. Chaffee warned of the "sanctimonious election stampede, a
stampede that [had] trampled the Constitution" in the House; Sen. Mathias
warned of the danger of "forgetting fundamental principles" where there was so
little opportunity to study a bill that "did not emerge from the crucible of the
committee process tempered by the heat of debate," and "committees are
important because, like them or not, they do provide a means by which
legislation can be put through a filter, can be exposed to public view and public
discussion .... If we are contemplating changes to individual freedoms, if we
are about to alter major social commitments, then those modifications simply
must be discussed fully... the consequences must be anticipated." Sen. Quayle
expressed "reservations about aspects of this proposal and the rapid processes
used to develop it." Id. at 784 n.51.
144. Id. at 784.
145. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
146. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
147. 443 U.S. at 466.
148. Id. at 464-65.
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The Supreme Court rejected the school administrators' argu-
ment that this result was based on a misapplication of the pur-
pose requirement established in Washington v. Davis, saying that
given the affirmative duty to desegregate, perpetuation of a sys-
tem that results in foreseeable, measurable disparate impact can
be evidence of discriminatory purpose.
The connection between foreseeability of disparate impact
in a case involving segregated schools, where a clear affirmative
duty to desegregate exists, and disparate impact in a facially neu-
tral criminal statute, is tenuous. Yet Judge Cahill extended the
foreseeability argument of Penick to Claty. Again referring to
racial imagery of the "legions" of newspaper and magazine exhib-
its introduced into the Congressional Record, Judge Cahill
concluded:
To keep crack out of suburbia meant to keep crack users
and dealers out of suburban neighborhoods. While it may
not have been intentional, it was foreseeable that the harsh
penalties imposed upon blacks would be more clearly dis-
proportional to the far more lenient sentences given
whites for use of the same drug - cocaine.1 49
The consequences, Judge Cahill concluded, were foreseeable.
And the racially disparate result was unquestionable: Edward
Clary introduced evidence that 98.2 percent of defendants con-
victed of crack cocaine charges in the Eastern District were
black,"5 and that all defendants sentenced for simple possession
of crack were black. Further, while national statistics indicated
that blacks were four times as likely as whites to be arrested on
drug charges, local statistics showed that they were eight times as
likely to be arrested on such charges in the Eastern District of
Missouri.151 As far back as Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 1 2 Judge Cahill
pointed out, the Supreme Court ruled:
[T]he effect of a law may be so harsh or adverse in its
weight against a particular race that an intent to discrimi-
nate is not only a permissible inference, but a necessary
one ... . This appears to be the effect of the crack statute
challenged in this court.'55
Reviewing statistics on arrests and prosecution for crack
cocaine offenses, Judge Cahill also found ample evidence of dis-
criminatory prosecutorial selection on the basis of race. Harsh
149. 846 F. Supp. at 785.
150. Id. at 786.
151. Id.
152. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
153. 846 F. Supp. at 787.
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penalties, in theory, were designed to target drug kingpins. But
both locally and nationally, the data did not show that enforce-
ment was reaching the upper echelons. "Out of 57 convictions in
the Eastern District of Missouri," Judge Cahill recounts, "55 of
the defendants were black, one was white, one was Hispanic, and
not one kingpin among them... . Even a disinterested inquirer
would wonder why the tremendous expense of federal prosecu-
tion and subsequent incarceration should be wasted on relatively
minor offenders. " "54
Given all of this - the extreme racial disproportionality in
outcome, the foreseeability of that disparate impact, the highly
unusual fast-track legislative process, the country's history of
racism and racially motivated drug laws - what is the appropri-
ate standard by which to review legislation that may have been
tainted by unconscious racism? Judicial deference to legislative
decisions is ordinarily appropriate, "[biut once there is proof
that a discriminatory motive is afoot," Judge Cahill wrote, "judi-
cial deference is no longer justified. ' "155 A law that so clearly
burdens a racial minority disproportionately and that is traceable
to racial considerations (even if unconscious) "warrants the most
rigorous scrutiny:"
Such a law can survive only if the classification which is sus-
pect is narrowly tailored to further a compelling govern-
mental interest. [Citations omitted.] Consistent with the
history of criminalizing behavior among minority groups
in this country, at the very least, the crack statute in its
application has created a "de facto suspect classification" to
which strict scrutiny must apply.156
Under strict scrutiny, Judge Cahill wrote, the crack statute must
fail. Congress had no medical or other evidence that crack was
100 times more addictive or dangerous than powder cocaine.
"[I]f young white males were being incarcerated at the same rate
as young black males," Judge Cahill concluded, "the statute
would have been amended long ago."157 The record shows no
reasonable basis for punishing a derivative drug more harshly
than its principal source; the statute is not narrowly tailored, and
therefore, Judge Cahill concluded, it is invalid.
Judge Cahill's decision has been criticized for his "failure to
recognize and respect the genuine and important differences
154. Id. at 788.
155. Id. at 791 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977)).
156. Id. at 791.
157. Id. at 792.
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between crack and powder cocaine."" There is some validity to
this criticism. Judge Cahill's emphatic assertion that "COCAINE
IS COCAINE"'59 overlooks important facts. Crack cocaine is typi-
cally marketed to a younger, more vulnerable, and poorer cus-
tomer base than is powder cocaine. Because it is smoked rather
than snorted, crack affects the user more quickly than does pow-
der cocaine."8 But his fundamental criticism of the 100:1 crack/
powder sentencing disparity - that legislative processes leading
to the harsh crack cocaine penalties were infected with uncon-
scious racism - is right on target. An equal protection analysis
that demands evidence of demonstrated, overt racism is virtually
obsolete as a judicial tool at this juncture in the nation's history.
D. Appellate Response to Clary
Seven months afterJudge Cahill's ruling, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals vacated his downward departure in sentencing
Clary,16 1 brushing past the thorough discussion of unconscious
racism and emphasizing precedent.
The district court's opinion was painstakingly crafted, wrote
Senior Circuit Judge John R. Gibson, "undoubtedly present[ing]
the most complete record on this issue" to date.16' But the case
should have been decided on precedent, he wrote, citing 17
recent cases from the circuit.16 In United States v. Lattimore, for
example, the court applied the rule that a facially neutral law
disproportionately affecting a minority is unconstitutional only if
it can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.' 64 In United States v.
Buckner, the court looked to legislative history and, citing state-
ments by five Senators on the dangers of crack, decided that the
more severe penalties for crack were not arbitrary or irra-
tional." And Arlington itself makes it clear that impact alone is
not determinative.1 66
Unpersuaded by Judge Cahill's argument that the Arlington
factor-analysis suggested a discriminatory motive at play, and thus
that strict scrutiny was required, the appellate court stated that
"[t]he [district] court's reasoning [regarding unconscious
158. David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REv.
1283, 1306 (1995).
159. 846 F. Supp. at 793.
160. SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT at 29.
161. 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1172 (1995).
162. Id. at 713.
163. Id. at 712.
164. 974 F.2d 971, 975 (8th Cir. 1992).
165. 34 F.3d at 712.
166. Id. at 713.
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racism] ... simply does not address the question whether Con-
gress acted with a discriminatory purpose." 67 Holding to the
"perpetrator" interpretation of Washington v. Davis,168 the appel-
late court wrote thatJudge Cahill's reasoning did not support the
conclusion that the crack statutes were passed because of, not in
spite of, their adverse and disproportionate impact on
minorities:
It is too long a leap from newspaper and magazine articles
to an inference that Congress enacted the crack statute
because of its adverse effect on African American males,
instead of the stated purpose of responding to the serious
impact of a rapidly-developing and particularly-dangerous
form of drug use. 6
9
Accordingly, the appellate court remanded the case for
resentencing. 7°
On remand, Clary was sentenced to 151 months imprison-
ment by Judge Hamilton, Chief Judge of the Eastern District of
Missouri.1 71 He appealed, challenging the 100:1 ratio on two
arguments. First, echoing Judge Forrester's analysis in United
States v. Davis, Clary argued that the rule of lenity should render
the crack-cocaine penalty provisions of § 841 inoperable on the
grounds that there is no scientific difference between crack and
powder forms of cocaine. Second, he argued that Congress's
rejection of the Sentencing Commission's recommendation to
amend the guidelines constituted evidence of discriminatory pur-
pose. The appellate court affirmed Clary's sentence, holding
that his equal protection and rule-of-lenity arguments were fore-
closed by precedent."
III. THE RACIAL BIAs "OuR LAw DoEs NOT SEE"
... [Tlhere are certain important dimensions of racial injustice
that our law does not see. 73
The Eighth Circuit, reversing Clary, applied rational basis
analysis and missed the truth. 74 It is demonstrably not a long
167. Id.
168. Washington, supra note 129.
169. 34 F.3d at 713.
170. Id. at 714.
171. 97 F.3d 1457 (8th Cir. 1996).
172. Id.
173. Sklansky, supra note 158, at 1284.
174. Commenting on the Supreme Court's May 13, 1996, decision in
United States v. Armstrong, 116 S.Ct. 1480 (1996), the editorial writers of the
Los Angeles Times wrote of the current drug sentencing scheme: "Putting aside
the defendants' race, the blatant inequality exercised under these laws now
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leap from magazine articles, newspaper accounts, and television
coverage to the inference that Congress, swayed by racial biases
embedded in public opinion, brushed aside normal legislative
procedures designed to produce fair and rational legislation.
If the goal of mandatory minimum sentences for drug-
related crimes is to stem drug traffic by cracking down on traf-
fickers and kingpins, 175 then the 100:1 disparity is patently illogi-
cal. It imposes the harshest penalties on street-level dealers, the
people at the tail end of the drug distribution chain who are the
most easily replaced.
Racial fears and stereotypes were clearly central to creating
perceptions of the nature and urgency of the crack-cocaine prob-
lem, and it is equally clear that they played a part in Congress's
design of the solution.
A. How the Media Narrated the Story of Crack Cocaine
George Gerbner and other communications researchers
have documented how the words and pictures we see, via mass
media, form our understanding of social reality. It would be
impossible to have any reasonably realistic concept of a complex
society without the aid of mass media in selecting and correlating
what goes on around us. But it is easy to forget that the people
who fulfill this function are human beings, selecting information,
weaving narratives, and, simply because of the nature of the task
of choosing relevant detail, excluding what doesn't fit the story
line.
As Judge Cahill demonstrated in Clary, the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1986 was hurried through the legislative process at the
crest of a wave of media attention to the crack "epidemic." By
the Sentencing Commission's tally:
In the months leading up to the 1986 elections, more than
1,000 stories appeared on crack in the national press,
including five cover stories each in Time and Newsweek.
NBC news ran 400 separate reports on crack (15 hours of
airtime). Time called crack the "Issue of the Year" (Sep-
tember 12, 1986). Newsweek called crack the biggest news
story since Vietnam and Watergate (June 16, 1986).'76
Ironically, the devices of effective journalism - personalizing
issues with the stories of real-life people, communicating the
looms large, seen by all but acknowledged by few." Coul Ruling on Crack Leaves
the Farness Issue Hanging; Disparity Question Has Validity, and It Won't Go Away,
L.A. TIMEs, at B, May 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5269348.
175. Sklansky, supra note 158, at 1297.
176. SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT at 122.
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human dimensions of stories through the use of detail and speci-
ficity in both words and pictures - may have worked to feed
racial fears and prejudices. Consider these often-quoted exam-
ples of media personification of the crack trade, read into the
Congressional Record:
A relatively early series of articles about crack in the Palm
Beach Post and Evening Times... noted that "[1l ess than a
block from where unsuspecting white retirees play tennis,
bands of young black men push their rocks on passing
motorists, interested or not." And when a Newsweek cover
story, also reprinted and applauded in the Congressional
Record, warned of "ominous signs that crack and rock
dealers are expanding well beyond the inner city," it
accompanies that warning with photographs of two crack
dealers, both black males, and offered the following
description of a third: "One of the boldest dealers on the
street is 'Eare,' a big-shouldered Trinidadian wearing gold
chains and a diamond-studded bracelet with his name
engraved in it .... Eare operates as brazenly as a three-
card-monte dealer, waving fistfuls of bills around as he
deals his drugs at the comer of 42nd and Seventh."
17 7
Just two years after the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1986, George Bush's campaign strategist Lee Atwater used
exactly the same type of stereotype to gain political advantage.
Atwater designed a negative television advertisement portraying
the menacing face of convicted murderer Willie Horton, a black
man, to play to racial anxieties while ostensibly attacking Demo-
cratic Presidential candidate Gov. Michael Dukakis's record on
crime control.1
78
177. Sklansky, supra note 158, at 1293-94.
178. As described by Michael Tonry:
Willie Horton's is a terrible story, but it shows the cynicism of
racial politics. Horton, [a black man] who in 1975 had been convicted
of the 1974 murder of a seventeen-year-old boy, failed to return from a
June 12, 1986 [prison] furlough. In April of the following year, he
broke into an Oxon Hill, Maryland, home where he raped a woman
and stabbed her companion.
Lee Atwater... decided in 1988 to make Willie Horton a "wedge"
issue for the Republicans. Atwater reportedly told a group of party
activists that Bush would win the election "if I can make Willie Horton
a household name."
Atwater at first denied making this and another statement, to the effect that he
would make Willie Horton Dukakis's "running mate," but later, dying of cancer,
admitted the comments and said, "I am sorry for both statements." Mxi.HA
TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECr 11 (1995).
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The 1986 deluge of media reports on crack firmly fixed an
equally threatening image in the public mind: the picture of
young black males as the source of a spreading, dangerous, and
destructive new drug problem. To believe that this manner of
covering the crack-cocaine story did not excite racial fears is com-
parable to believing the Willie Horton ads were about crime and
not race. Anxiety and prejudice as bases of public opinion trans-
late into constituent pressures on Congress; from there it is a very
short step to the embodiment of whatJudge Cahill characterizes
as "unconscious racism" in law.
Federal courts are trapped in the conflict: the inequities of
the crack-cocaine statutes are apparent, yet current equal protec-
tion analysis is no help in eliminating them. As David Sklansky
points out, black defendants have challenged the crack-cocaine
penalties in all of the federal courts of appeals, with consistent
results: "the defendants always have lost, and the opinions gener-
ally have been both unanimous and short." 7 9 Yet, as illustrated
by the comments ofjurists such as District Judges Cahill, Ziegler,
Strom, Greene, Forrester, and Sachs, and CircuitJudges Heaney
and Calabresi, 8 ° widespread recognition exists within the judici-
ary that these sentences are not just.
B. The Opportunity Lost in United States v. Armstrong
In United States v. Armstrong,'8' the Supreme Court had an
opportunity to address the 100:1 crack/powder sentencing dis-
parity. Christopher Lee Armstrong and four others were
arrested in 1992 and charged with conspiracy to possess and dis-
tribute more than fifty grams of crack cocaine under 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841 and 846, as well as federal firearms charges.' 8 2 They
responded by filing a motion for discovery or dismissal, claiming
that they were victims of racially motivated selective prosecu-
tion.' 83 The government opposed the discovery motion on the
ground that there was no evidence or allegation of unfair action
on the government's part. When the District Court granted the
defendants' discovery motion, the government moved for recon-
sideration, presenting affidavits and other evidence to support
the argument that race was not a factor in prosecutorial selec-
tion, thatJamaican, Haitian, and black street gangs dominate the
manufacture and distribution of crack, and that other circum-
179. Sklansky, supra note 158, at 1303.
180. See supra notes 59-73.
181. 116 S.Ct. 1480 (1996).
182. Id. at 1483.
183. Id.
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stances of the case justified the prosecution of Armstrong and his
codefendants.' The District Court denied the government's
motion for reconsideration, and the government refused to com-
ply with the discovery order, the District Court then dismissed
the case. l s5
A divided three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the proof requirements for a
selective-prosecution claim required the defendants to provide a
colorable basis for their assertion that others similarly situated
received different treatment. 86 The Ninth Circuit then voted to
rehear the case en banc; the en banc panel affirmed the District
Court's dismissal on the grounds that a defendant is not required
to demonstrate that the government has chosen not to prosecute
others who are similarly situated. l87
The Supreme Court, however, concluded that the defend-
ants had not satisfied the requirement of a threshold showing of
selective prosecution."s Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the
Court, noting that neither the District Court nor the Court of
Appeals referred to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16,
which governs discovery in criminal cases.189 Holding that Rule
16 "authorizes defendants to examine Government documents
material to the preparation of their defense against the Govern-
ment's case-in-chief, but not to the preparation of selective-prose-
cution claims,"190 the Court reversed, noting that extensive
discovery would impose significant costs on the government and
divert prosecutorial resources. 1 ' "The vast majority of the
Courts of Appeals,"Justice Rehnquist noted, "require the defend-
ant to produce some evidence that similarly situated defendants
of other races could have been prosecuted but were not ... ;"12
the evidence submitted by Armstrong et at "recounted hearsay
and reported personal conclusions based on anecdotal evi-
dence,"193 he concluded. Two Justices wrote short concur-
rences,19 and Justice Breyer concurred in part and in the
judgment.195
184. Id. at 1484.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1484-85.
188. Id. at 1485-88.
189. Id. at 1485.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1488.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1489.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1489-92.
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Justice Stevens was the sole dissenter. He was also the only
Justice who addressed the core issues underlying the harsh crack-
cocaine penalties. This case required more than construction of
a procedural rule, Justice Stevens said; it required analysis of the
broader context in which it arose:
The District Judge's order [to dismiss] should be eval-
uated in the light of three circumstances that underscore
the need for judicial vigilance over certain types of drug
prosecutions. First, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and
subsequent legislation established a regime of extremely
high penalties for the possession and distribution of so-
called "crack cocaine." . . . These penalties result in
sentences for crack offenders that average three to eight
times longer than sentences for comparable powder
offenders.... Second, the disparity between the treatment
of crack cocaine and powder cocaine is matched by the dis-
parity between the severity of the punishment imposed by
federal law and that imposed by state law for the same con-
duct. ... For example, if respondent Hampton is found
guilty, his federal sentence might be as long as a
mandatory life term. Had he been tried in state court, his
sentence could have been as short as 12 years .... Finally,
it is undisputed that the brunt of the elevated federal pen-
alties falls heavily on blacks. . . . The extraordinary severity
of the imposed penalties and the troubling racial patterns
of enforcement give rise to a special concern about the
fairness of charging practices for crack offenses.
196
The District Judge, Justice Stevens concluded, acted well within
her discretion when calling for development of facts that would
illuminate the government's choice of forum for such
offenses. 197
Armstrong challenged the disparate impact of the crack
cocaine penalties as an issue of selective prosecution. Despite
Justice Stevens's allusions to the need for "careful scrutiny" of
any colorable claim of discriminatory enforcement of the harsh
crack-cocaine penalties, 9" the majority took the narrow view,
confining its discussion primarily to the issues of required evi-
dentiary thresholds and construction of Rule 16. It will be of lit-
te help in resolving the frustration felt by federal judges who are
required to apply penalties so many feel are fundamentally
unjust.
196. Id. at 1492-94.
197. Id. at 1494.
198. Id. at 1495.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
I think we can prove and have been able to prove what
works: punishment for the career criminal punishment for the
young offender who commits a violent act, but punishment that's
fair, that fits the crime.199
Where racial biases have inappropriately seeped into legisla-
tion, as they have in the case of the 100:1 crack/powder cocaine
sentencing laws, judges need a decision-making methodology
that takes such factors into account.
Courts and commentators have proposed a variety of solu-
tions to the "paradigmatic case of unconscious racism"2" repre-
sented by the federal crack penalties. Judge Cahill would take
unconscious racism into account where a disparate impact is so
obvious that it shocks the conscience of the court, abandoning
judicial deference to legislative decisions in such cases and apply-
ing strict scrutiny even where a law is facially neutral. Judge Cala-
bresi's comments suggest that though Congress may not have
been consciously motivated by racial animus at the time the pen-
alties became law, Congressional failure to act, knowing what we
know now, may undermine the validity of the crack cocaine
penalties.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in State v. Russel4 01 applied
a more stringent approach to equal protection, based on the
Minnesota constitution, in considering a challenge to disparate
sentencing for crack offenders. Distinctions that produce differ-
ent sentences must not be "manifestly arbitrary or fanciful," the
state high court wrote. Classifications must be genuine and rele-
vant to the purpose of the law, and the purpose must be one that
the state can legitimately attempt to achieve.2 °" By that standard,
the court held that a Minnesota statute imposing harsher penal-
ties for crack offenses than for powder-cocaine offenses failed
"for lack of a genuine and substantial distinction." °" The legisla-
ture, said the court, had based its distinction on anecdotal evi-
dence and had no substantive proof that crack cocaine is more
addictive or dangerous than the same drug in powder form.2°
199. Statement of Attorney General Janet Reno, news briefing, FEDERAL
DocuMENT CLF.ARMo HousE PoLrcAL TRANscIUTs, Sept. 7, 1995.
200. Sklansky, supra note 158, at 1308.
201. 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991); at issue was a state law that enhanced
crack cocaine penalties by a 10-to-3 ratio.
202. Id. at 888.
203. Id. at 889.
204. Id.
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David Sklansky, pointing out that current equal protection
doctrine was developed primarily in non-criminal contexts, pro-
poses that we give up "our insistence on a unified doctrine" and
agree to tolerate a disaggregated concept of equal protection:
It matters, to begin with, that the sanctions are criminal.
When a law imposes long periods of incarceration -
instead of, say, allocating employment opportunities -
inequalities attributable to race are especially intolerable.
Locking someone up in a cage for a period of years is sin-
gularly serious business. °5
Courts could also, he suggests, apply the concept of burden-shift-
ing: "when a federal sentencing rule is shown to have a seriously
disproportionate impact on black defendants . . . the govern-
ment should be required to rebut the inference of conscious or
unconscious racism by providing an alternative explanation for
the rule."20 ' This is not only sensible, it is supported by prece-
dent. Burden-shifting "based on a showing of disproportionate
impact is well established... in cases involving statutory claims of
discrimination, constitutional challenges to jury selection, and
remedial challenges to school desegregation. " 207 Isolating one
out of three young black men within the criminal justice sys-
tem20 8 is at least as serious a problem as segregating a school
system, and extension of burden-shifting to cases of disparate
impact resulting from criminal prosecutions is warranted.
Insistence on finding a racially discriminatory purpose over-
looks what Lee Atwater knew for a fact: racial fears can drive
political decision-making, whether such fears are excited by
intentional manipulation or unintentionally. Facially neutral
laws, in some circumstances, can embody racial fears, the same
way a negative, racially inflammatory, Willie-Horton-style cam-
paign ad can influence who occupies the White House.
Cocaine is destructive. Crack cocaine, because of its easy
appeal to more vulnerable potential users, is a particularly insidi-
ous form of the drug. But the 100:1 crack/powder ratio has no
rational scientific or epidemiological basis, nor is it rationally
205. Sklansky, supra note 158, at 1316.
206. Id. at 1319.
207. Id. at 1318.
208. According to the New York Times, data gathered by the Justice
Department and assembled by The Sentencing Project show that one out of
three black men in their 20s are imprisoned, on probation, or on parole. A
study released in 1994 reported that one in four young black men were under
the control of the criminal justice system. Fox Butterfield, More Blacks in Their
20's Have Trouble With the Law, N.Y. TimS, Oct. 10, 1995, at A-18.
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related to any coherent strategy to inhibit the distribution of
cocaine.
Because crack is typically marketed to younger, poorer; and
more vulnerable victims than is powder cocaine, and because the
organizations that market crack pose special problems for the
communities they dominate, additional penalties for crack distri-
bution may be justified. But enforcing the arbitrarily selected
distinction embodied in the 100:1 disparity does much to erode
confidence in the criminal justice system, even while it diverts
legislative attention from the harder questions: the causes of
crime, and how to heal a society in which one out of every three
young black men is under the supervision of the criminal justice
system.
209
More to the point, the harsh penalties are not working. "In
the end," according to Glenn Loury, "the anti-drug strategy has
had a negligible impact on the supply of cocaine and heroin, but
it has caused a major increase in the supply of black convicts."210
Meanwhile, public attitudes toward the court system are on a
slide downward: in 1994, fifty-three percent of whites and blacks
held unfavorable views of the court system. Just two years later,
in 1996, sixty-three percent of whites and fifty-six percent of
blacks viewed the system unfavorably.21' Signs of corrosion in
fundamental elements of the system are appearing: as the per-
centages of young black men in prison rise, some black jurors
"are choosing to disregard the evidence, however powerful,
because they seek to protest racial injustice and to refrain from
adding to the already large number of blacks behind bars."212
At present, Congress is considering a variety of measures to
either end or lessen the crack/powder sentencing disparity.
Some propose implementing a 1:1 ratio. Others would raise pen-
alties for possession of powder cocaine, creating a new ratio of,
for example, 20:1.211 Some proposals suggest increasing the pen-
alties for possession of powder cocaine to the same level as those
for crack cocaine. 14 What impact such a move would have on
209. Sklansky, supra note 158, at 1316.
210. Glenn Loury, The Impossible Dilemma: Betuen Blak Crime and Judicial
Racism, NEw REPuBLc, Jan. 1, 1996, at 23.
211. Public opinion data collected by Pew Research Center for the
People & The Press; personal correspondence, Feb. 1, 1996.
212. Benjamin A. Holden et aL, Race Seems to Play An Increasing Role in
Many Jury Verdics, WALL ST.J., Oct. 4, 1995, at 1.
213. Lee Otis, staff researcher for Sen. Spencer Abraham; telephone
interview, Jan. 24, 1996.
214. See, eg., H.B. 332, submitted jointly to House Committees on
Judiciary and Commerce on January 1, 1997, or S.B. 209, submitted to the
Senate Judiciary Committee.
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prosecutorial resources or federal prison populations remains to
be seen.
Even if Congress adjusts the current powder/crack sentenc-
ing disparity, however, the crack laws have exposed a serious gap
in current equal protection analysis. Insisting on finding a dis-
criminatory purpose behind this particular legislative scheme,
which has such a clear and significant racially disparate impact,
ignores what every advertising or public relations practitioner
knows for a fact: our perceptions of what's going on in society
are largely formed by the explicit and implicit messages we see
and hear through the media.
Racially disparate impact doesn't prove that improper racial
considerations influenced the design of a legislative scheme. But
its presence should be seen as a suggestion that unconscious
racial attitudes or beliefs may have influenced the process. The
powder/crack legislative scheme is a perfect example: even
members of Congress complained that the fast-track, abbreviated
process was a "sanctimonious election stampede" that could lead
to "forgetting fundamental principles."2 15
Where important liberty interests are at stake, and where evi-
dence of racially disparate impact is clear and compelling, courts
should employ a level of scrutiny that allows examination of hid-
den factors that may have improperly influenced the design of
the legislative solution. In such cases, the burden should shift to
the government to establish that there is in fact a fit between the
means selected and the end the legislature hoped to achieve.
215. Supra note 143.
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